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CONTRACTS AND SALES
DOUGLASS G. BOSHKOFFt

the traditional subject matter of this Survey article
P RESUMABLY
may cause some readers to skip rapidly to newer fields of law
where more changes appear to be taking place. Honesty compels the
admission that the Michigan Supreme Court has made no startling
pronouncements in this area during the past year, and yet the few
cases that are discussed present some very interesting insights into a
wide variety of contractual problems. Pride of authorship gives rise
to the hope that the following discussion will still be of value to the
practicing Bar.
I
FORMATION OF CONTRACT*

Lovers of legal technicality find much to admire in the Statute of
Frauds and in decisions applying it. Simply stated, the statute prevents
inquiry into what happened because of apprehension that human
duplicity or the frailties of memory may lead the trier of fact to an
erroneous conclusion. Attitudes toward application of the statute to
any particular case are colored by the various opinions as to what
really happened. An impartial observer will find the statute most
rigorous and unjust in application if he is convinced that the oral
contract was in fact made. The desire of judges to find out what really
happened has resulted in a gradual erosion of the statute through the
development of various doctrines of avoidance and relaxation of the requirements for a valid memorandum. The trend is undoubtedly away
from rigid enforcement of the statute. This trend is illustrated by the
recent decision in Randazzo v. Kroenke,1 in which the Michigan Supreme Court held that a memorandum satisfied the statute even though
it did not identify the plaintiff. That item could be supplied by oral
testimony.
Two lines of argument appear in the opinion of Justice Souris.
First, relying on a lengthy quotation from Corbin,2 he argued that
t
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* Several cases do not merit discussion in the body of this article. They are: People
ex rel. Yeager Bridge & Culvert Co. v. Cooke Contracting Co., 372 Mich. 563, 127
N.W.2d 308 (1964) (failure to give required notice discharges surety) ; Alan James Dev.
Corp. v. Village of Michiana, 372 Mich. 240, 125 N.W.2d 894 (1964) (letter expressing
willingness to deal not an offer); Hansen v. Catsman, 371 Mich. 79, 123 N.W.2d 265
(1963) (agreement to agree not a binding contract).
1. 373 Mich. 61, 127 N.W.2d 880 (1964).
2. 2 Corbin, Contracts § 500 (1950).
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ther& was little danger of fraud if oral evidence supplied the identity
of the plaintiff in all cases of this type. It is difficult to differ with this
position. One is hard put to imagine substantial danger to the defendant
arising from oral identification of the plaintiff. Of course, there is no
criteria of substantial danger or the like found in the statute but this
is presumably a valid item for the court to consider in deciding what
the memorandum should contain.
The second argument, advanced to support the first, is found in
the closing lines of the opinion.
An examination of the pleading and pretrial proceedings in this
case make it evident that defendant never seriously contended that
plaintiff was not the vendee under the contract which he sought to
establish. Holding this memorandum sufficient to satisfy the statute of
frauds does not work a fraud on anyone. The law of contracts is still in
force, and plaintiff must establish the terms of the contract, while
defenses such as incompetency still may be raised. As was noted in
Wozniak, supra, at 435 [of 352 Mich., at 458 of 90 N.W.2d,] "equity
can and will, given appealing equities arrayed against perfidy or fast
dealing, prevent most of the frauds section 8 . . .of this venerable

statute was intended to frustrate."8
Such reasoning is open to question. Although the statute may not
be popular it was still adopted to prevent inquiry into what happened
in a particular case. This being so, the likelihood of truth of the oral
assertion is immaterial. The case cannot be viewed on the merits
without subverting the purpose of the statute. Justice Souris' opinion
reflects a feeling, which is probably very widely held, that the statute
may be ignored when everybody knows that there really was a contract.
The writer does not wish to make any brief for the statute. Yet
as long as it exists courts ought to apply it without regard to the merits
of the individual case. In this respect the Randazzo opinion is most
interesting since it shows both a correct and an incorrect theoretical
basis for interpreting the statutory language.
Another very interesting case is Munro v. Boston Ins. Co.,4 which
presented the question of whether a casualty insurer was obligated
on a policy of fire insurance which had expired prior to the fire loss.
The plaintiff sought to extend the coverage of the policy past the
expiration date on some theory of estoppel. Evidently, plaintiff wished
to argue that there was a custom of notifying customers of the time for
renewal and that plaintiff was justified in relying on continued existence of coverage until he either received a renewal billing or a notice
of termination of coverage. This contention was unsuccessful. At the
conclusion of his opinion, Chief Justice Carr stated,
3.
4.

Supra note 2, at 73, 127 N.W.2d at 886-87.
370 Mich. 604, 122 N.W.2d 654 (1963).

1964]

CONTRACTS AND SALES

The trial judge was correct in his conclusion that liability under
the express contract of insurance involved in this case could not be
extended on the theory advanced by plaintiffs with reference to the
alleged custom observed in the area by insurance agencies. As before
noted, the issue here involved is not estoppel or waiver of performance
in accordance with provisions of an existing contract, but presents an
attempt to enlarge and extend the insurance coverage specifically provided in the contract. The acceptance of appellants' claim would result,
in effect, in creation of liability following the expiration of the policy as
written, and would from a practical standpoint be the equivalent of
creating a new contract between the parties. 5
Certainly, in traditional terms of offer and acceptance, plaintiff
has a hard argument. It is difficult to find an offer to renew the policy
when a specific expiration date is stated. Even a custom of renewal
in fact would probably not amount to an offer in all cases unless an
extreme situation were reached in which both persons would be
bound.6 However, it must also be admitted that there might be a relationship between the insured and the selling agent which would lead
the former to an expectation that he would be given notice if continued
coverage would not be forthcoming. If this were so, liability could be
predicated on estoppel without creating a new contract between the
parties. The opinion in this case does not clearly set forth the custom
established by the plaintiff. Perhaps the custom was not sufficient to
create liability. However, the implications of the opinion that no
custom could ever help the plaintiff seem doubtful. The existence of
liability arising out of the relationship between the selling agent of the
company and the plaintiff should not be dismissed in such an off-hand
manner.
Van Rensselaer v. General Motors Corp.,7 presented the question
of whether the defendant was obligated to pay for the use of certain
ideas submitted to it by the plaintiff. On the issue of true contract
responsibility, District Court Judge Talbot Smith noted that the
defendant had promptly rejected the plaintiff's submission of ideas.
The plaintiff had pleaded in the alternative a theory of quasi-contractual responsibility; but this argument also failed. Judge Smith
held that the ideas were not novel and further, that there was no
fiduciary relationship between the parties. The plaintiff would have
had to establish both points to recover in quasi-contract. 8
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 612, 122 N.W.2d at 657.
See American Cent. Ins. Co. v. Hardin, 148 Ky. 246, 146 S.W. 418 (1912).
223 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
See generally, Havighurst, The Right to Compensation for an Idea, 49 Nw. U.L.

Rev. 295 (1954).
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II
PROBLEMS OF CONSTRUCTION

A gasoline station lease granted the lessee an option to purchase
the premises upon the death of the lessor. The plaintiffs became holdover tenants at the expiration of the lease and subsequently attempted
to exercise the purhase option. In Glocksine v. Malleck,9 the court held
that the option could not be exercised by the tenants holding over. In
a holdover tenancy, as contrasted with a renewal tenancy, all the
terms of the original lease do not necessarily become part of the obligations of the parties. The incidents of the holdover tenancy are implied
by law and the court held that because the option price was a fixed
sum it was not justified in implying that the purchase option became
part of the holdover tenancy.

In NationalLumber Co. v. Goodman,"0 the purchaser of a vendee's
interest under a land contract sought to enjoin foreclosure proceedings
instituted by the contract vendor. The contract provided:
No assignment or conveyance by the purchaser shall create any
liability whatsoever against the seller until a duplicate thereof, duly
witnessed and acknowledged, together with the residence address of
such assignee, shall be delivered to and accepted by the seller, and
receipt thereof indorsed thereon."
Although there had been no compliance with this clause the
assignee tendered the amount due on several of the land contracts in
question and requested a release of the lots. The court, emphasizing
that the personal element of trust in the vendee under the original
contract was very important to the vendor, held that since the assignment had not been acknowledged by the vendor, the vendee's assignee
had not secured such an equity in the premises as would justify
granting the relief requested. This personal element is very important.
If it were not present, presumably the requested relief would have
been granted.
III
REMEDIES

The final case to be noted is McCarty v. Mercury Metalcraft
Co. 2 Defendant argued that plaintiff's premature termination of their
agreement was a breach of contract which prevented him from recov9. 372 Mich. 115, 125 N.W.2d 298 (1963).
10. 371 Mich. 54, 123 N.W.2d 147 (1963).
11. Id. at 56, 123 N.W.2d at 148.
12. 372 Mich. 567, 127 N.W.2d 340 (1964).

1964]

CONTRACTS AND SALES

191

ering unpaid commissions due under the agreement. The court held
that since the plaintiff's breach was not so substantial as to prevent
the defendant from performing his obligations, it would not preclude
recovery by the plaintiff. Denial of compensation to the plaintiff in
this situation is not necessary to protect the defendant.

